

CHILDREN'S LEGISLATIVE REPORT CARD

LEGISLATIVE SESSION: 2003–04
REPORT CARD TERM: 2004


Dear Californians,

This *Report Card* reflects the grades attributed to California legislators for their votes on child-related legislation during the second year of the 2003–04 legislative session. The grades you will see reflect each legislator's votes on 17 bills that ran through policy and fiscal committees and achieved votes on both the Assembly and Senate floors. For the first time ever, this *Report Card* also includes four additional bills, two of which were passed by the Assembly but died in the Suspense File of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and two of which were passed by the Senate, but died in the Suspense File of the Assembly Appropriations Committee. For those measures, the *Report Card* reflects the floor vote cast by legislators in the house of origin, and a "No" vote for legislators in the other house—reflecting the fact that each legislator in that house allowed the bill to die in the Suspense File without an affirmative vote. Thus, this *Report Card* reflects each legislator's actions on 21 total measures.

As explained in the "Year in Review" below, 2003–04 will be remembered for the historic recall of California's Governor and the continuation of the state's staggering budget shortfall—with resulting cuts and deferral of unprecedented costs for many years beyond 2004–05. Although personal income for California adults continues to increase, investment in our children and their future has declined and will be cut by many billions more without decisive legislative intervention in 2004. While that intervention was forthcoming to moderate proposed severe cuts, the overall trend is one of disinvestment and deferral of costs to burden future budgets. Those willing to act for children were impeded by the structural requirement of a two-thirds supermajority to enact spending or to reduce or eliminate tax breaks—handing to a small but disciplined and radical minority the power to frustrate meaningful child protection and investment.

This *Report Card* is intended to educate and inform you of your legislators' actions—and inactions—on improving the status of and outcomes for children in this state. It cannot tell you all there is to know about your legislators. Accordingly, we urge you to communicate frequently with them so they know your expectations of them for California's children. Similarly, we urge you to communicate your expectations to your Governor, who vetoed 53% of the child-friendly measures discussed here—in that reached his desk.

Sincerely,



Robert C. Fellmeth
Executive Director, Children's Advocacy Institute




A Primer

THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

After introduction by a legislator, a bill is heard in the appropriate policy committee(s), and if it has a fiscal impact is then heard in the Appropriations Committee in the house of origin (either Assembly or Senate). If a bill passes those committees, it is next voted upon by all members of that house (the “floor vote”). If the bill passes a floor vote in the house of origin, it then goes to the other house and begins the process all over again (policy committee(s), Appropriations Committee, and floor vote). At any of these points, the bill may be changed or “amended.” If the bill is amended in the second house, it must return for a second vote on the floor of the house of origin (the “concurrence vote”).

Once a bill passes both houses of the Legislature (and, if necessary, passes a concurrence vote in the house of origin), the Governor may sign it into law, veto it, or take no action within the constitutionally-prescribed time limit, thereby allowing it to become law without his/her signature. The only change a Governor may make in a bill, without sending it back to the Legislature, is to reduce or eliminate the money allocated in the bill.



Legislative Report Card 2004

THE YEAR IN REVIEW

In October 2003, incumbent Governor Gray Davis suffered a historic recall by California voters. Republican actor Arnold Schwarzenegger was elected to replace him. Governor Schwarzenegger was sworn into office on November 17, 2003 with much pomp and circumstance. The change in administration would be the most significant event affecting the 2004 legislative year.

The Schwarzenegger Factor

The new Governor entered office with strong support from the electorate. The rejection of Gray Davis was based on a combination of cited failures by his opponents—the mishandling of the energy crisis, frustrating indecision, preoccupation with fundraising, cynical proposals such as the granting of \$1,000 “Governor scholarships” to those scoring high in statewide tests at the voting age of 18, and budget gimmicks that shoved huge obligations forward to future years.

The Schwarzenegger Administration started with an extended “honeymoon” period from the media—perhaps predictable given prevalent deference to celebrity. Several signs augured well for the children of California. The new Governor had been the sponsor of Proposition 49, the “after school initiative” that assigned a minimum proportion of new General Fund revenues for the expansion of programs for child care—particularly those involving use of school facilities otherwise underutilized after the school day. The new Governor also promised to stand up to special interests, give children a high priority, resist the simplistic blandishments of the radical right, and increase opportunity through economic (business) expansion. His image was helped by his pleasant nature and brimming optimism, and burnished by the patina of masculine courage that some may imply from his celluloid film persona.

As a candidate, the new Governor often touted his role in sponsoring Proposition 49 and publicly announced his support for the Healthy Families subsidized insurance program for children, typically declaring: “We have to make sure that every child in California is insured. That is the most important thing...We have a Healthy Families program here in California, and it is a very, very good program...If I become governor, I would immediately go out there and get it out so everyone knows about it and every one signs up because we must insure our families, the low-income families, especially the children.”

The Governor made a series of momentous decisions shortly after taking office and before the 2004 legislative year began. First, he appointed Donna Arduin as Director of the Department of Finance (DOF), a critical post in formulating the state budget and coordinating with the Legislature. Ms. Arduin had served in a similar capacity in Florida, New York, and Michigan. In Florida, Arduin had instituted enrollment caps in the state’s equivalent to California’s Healthy Families program, causing thousands of children to lose coverage. Her record was one of fiscal cuts without substantial sensitivity to their consequences—especially for children.

Second, and more troubling, were the early direct fiscal decisions of the new Governor himself. The state faced the largest deficit in its history—a structural shortfall of well over \$11 billion. Some of that deficit was the result of improvident

spending, ranging from the \$1,000 scholarships noted above to extraordinary pension benefits for the state's politically powerful prison guards. And the problem was exacerbated by the bursting of the dot-com bubble which had been giving the state substantial state personal income and corporate tax revenue. But as documented in the *California Children's Budget 2004-05* (see www.cachildlaw.org), these explanations miss a fundamental dynamic in the state—the relentless shredding of the tax base through the enactment of what are now more than \$30 billion in annual tax deductions, credits and exemptions. Unlike direct spending, these favors continue indefinitely unless affirmatively ended, and then require a two-thirds supermajority to terminate or even to lessen to any degree. Accordingly, their imposition is an unsurprising goal of the 1,200 registered lobbyists in the Capitol—few of whom represent the interests of children.

A proper measure of public child investment in education, safety net provision, child care, protection from abuse, and other spending is a percentage of some measure of adult wealth that adjusts for population and inflation, such as gross domestic product or personal income. Taking the last, the 1978-79 commitment to the General Fund (most of which is invested in children) was 7.35%. That same commitment would produce \$11 billion more than the 2003-04 budget provided for children. The difficulty facing the state is less overspending than a gradual wasting away of state resources.

The shortfall is much exacerbated by the Proposition 13 property tax structure that substantially freezes real property assessments (and hence taxes) at 1977 levels—thus imposing ten or more times the taxes on youth seeking to buy a home than are paid by older adults for the same services. Existing corporations enjoy an even greater disparity over youth starting a new business. This discrimination against the young and its promised financial burden for the state's future children raise a profound ethical issue that neither the new Governor, nor the Legislature, have had the courage to address. That equal protection infirmity is separate and apart from the core element of Proposition 13—limiting property taxation to no more than 1% of a property's value. And the inequity the disparate assessments create grow year after year—and will continue to grow, raising profound ethical issues.

The underfinancing of the state General Fund is reflected in the number of state employees; California has among the lowest number per resident in the nation. More ominously is the funding of the single most important account for future generations: public education. In 2004, *Education Weekly*, a respected national source, measured the respective investment of the 50 states in K-12 education. Using 2001 data, California—once the national leader in public education—ranked 44th in the nation, between Mississippi and Louisiana.

Previous Republican administrations had faced unexpected and severe state deficits: Reagan in the late 1960s and Pete Wilson in 1991. Each had faced down reflexive “starve the beast of government” Republican legislators and made up the difference half by spending cuts (some disadvantageous to children) and half from new revenue. In current dollars, these new revenues would exceed \$4 billion. However, Governor Schwarzenegger—facing a larger deficit than his predecessors—not only did not add revenue, instead subtracted \$4 billion due the state annually from the Vehicle License Fee, a major source of revenue for local government. That cut was from a longstanding statutory base for VLF revenue. Instead of reducing the deficit from \$11 billion to \$5-7 billion, as his responsible Republican predecessors had done, he increased it from \$11 billion to \$15 billion.

Complicating the Governor's populist "reduce taxes" measure were the accounting hijinks of the Davis Administration, which had confronted an even larger deficit in 2003–04 and cloaked it in spending deferrals—many of which were arguably unlawful (borrowing or taking from pension and other special funds, spending twenty years of Tobacco Settlement Funds in two years by using the promised revenue for immediate bonds, paying June's bills in July to place them in the next fiscal year, and the floating of other allegedly unconstitutional bonds obligating future revenues).

The new Governor's solution was not to end the irresponsible fiscal policies of the recalled Davis Administration, but to magnify and legitimize (legally) a larger array of payment deferrals and obligation extensions. These policies were not interposed as a kind of "income averaging" to spread a deficit over two or three years of economic recovery—but involve payment obligation or income losses over the next ten to twenty years and beyond. Hence, the \$11 billion shortfall from the General Fund commitment of one generation ago as a percentage of their adult personal income now becomes \$15 billion under the 2004–05 budget, and the 7.35% commitment of personal income for General Fund investment has shrunk to 6.13%.

The Governor's initial budget proposal of 2004–05 followed the same pattern of former Governor Pete Wilson in his 1991 budget cuts, with the brunt of the reductions being borne by children, with safety net, foster care (abused children in state custody), health, and education taking huge cuts. California, one of the wealthiest states in the nation—with personal income projected substantially higher—would disinvest primarily in her children. Both in 1991 and in 2004, the Legislature refused to approve many of the more draconian reductions. But their rejection was softened in 1991–93 by revenues additions that allowed their moderation. In 2004–05, little new revenue was authorized—requiring an unprecedented deferral of payment to future years. This state version of deficit spending, approved by the electorate after a vigorous campaign by the new Governor, replicates to some degree the remarkable federal turnaround from \$5 trillion in surplus to \$4 trillion in deficits now projected to burden our children nationally (in addition to much higher projected payroll taxes for Social Security and Medicare support of the elderly). The primary exception to the absolute line against new state revenue were substantial increases in tuition and fees for higher education, and a doubling and tripling of license fees for child care and foster care providers.

Prior conservative administrations, particularly that of Pete Wilson, rather courageously took a strong public stance against private irresponsible adult behavior toward children. That administration pushed a "responsibility" agenda aimed at lessening unwed births that constitute a major cause of child poverty. It touted private reproductive responsibility and advanced numerous initiatives to further the interests of children, from the right of a child to be intended by two adults, to child support collection. And although fiscally conservative, when confronting more tax reductions against the public investment needs of children, it tolerated some measure of the former for the benefit of the latter, as discussed above. However, in his first year in office, Governor Schwarzenegger has represented the "perfect storm" of policies adverse to the interests of the state's children. His "social liberalism" inhibits the stimulation of private responsibility that was a hallmark of the prior Republican administration. At the same time, he has declined to stand up to the radical "neo-con" Republican legislative leadership who oppose any new tax revenues categorically (unless labeled "fees" and assessed against the politically weak). That opposition is in extremis notwithstanding two Congressional tax cuts that will save California adults an average of \$37 billion per year through 2011. The expenditure of public funds at the state and local level over federal spending is a time honored principle of

conservatives, but the portion of these momentous federal cuts recaptured by the state for more locally directed child investment is zero. At the same time, the state's \$30 billion in tax deductions, credits and exemptions continue to proliferate and grow, from the horse owner deduction to the yacht write-off.

The 2004–05 Budget

The most important legislative output in 2004 was the enactment of the state budget and its associated trailer bills, approved in the context of a new initiative outlining future budgetary limitations and a bond encumbering future budgets by \$15 billion plus accrued interest over a twenty-year period of repayment. An underlying structural feature of the state budget process is its requirement of a two-thirds vote to increase revenue, and a separate two-thirds vote to spend money. Only two other states have similar impediments to majority rule. That both revenue and spending in the budget can be blocked by a minority has been used since 2001 by Republican legislators to deprive the state of General Fund resources at historical or prudent levels for children. Hence, children are now caught in a cauldron of conservative surrender to social liberalism combined with liberal impotence to provide public investment in children. The Governor's placement at the apex of this two-party unstated contract against the interests of children cements its efficacy. The substantive consequences of the private license and public disinvestment include the following:

- *Health Coverage.* Over 800,000 California children continue to lack basic health coverage—coverage that is provided to children in every other developed nation in the world and to all of the elderly of the state and nation (costing five times the price of child coverage, and for a population with half the child poverty rate). Those uncovered children are primarily of the working poor and their parents who choose to seek medical attention for their children will pay three to five times the price paid by public payors and private insurance. Ironically, the Congress has announced a national policy to cover all children up to 250% of the poverty line and provides a 2–1 federal match. But the state maintains a fragmented system of enrollment, qualification, filtering, premiums and bureaucracy to keep these eligible children from basic coverage, and will send a record amount of federal monies back to Washington, D.C. The Legislature has refused to enact a modest “true presumptive eligibility” system and the Governor has violated his campaign statements by failing to move toward universal enrollment, and maintaining barriers to coverage.

- *Foster Care Betrayal.* California has one-fifth of the nation's abused and neglected children in foster care. That the state performs its role as parent to these children ineffectively is apparent to all familiar with this system—a failure the Children's Advocacy Institute documents through its clinic representing hundreds of those children. In recent years, the Assembly Democrats held hearings and acknowledged California's betrayal of these children, relegating them to repeated foster care placement changes and impersonal group home existence until abandoning them to the streets at age 18. The federal jurisdiction has warned the state that it is out of compliance with minimum standards. Instead of increasing our commitment to these children to provide at least minimally adequate protection and care, Governor Schwarzenegger removed from the budget \$17 in child welfare spending—an action which could sacrifice related federal matches and lead to the firing of 700 child protection workers at the county level. Legislation designed to moderate the confidentiality of juvenile dependency court to allow public examination of these failures was defeated. And over the last four years, substantive attempts to increase family foster care rates and supply have failed, despite the fact that the proposed increases would

still leave the larger and more politically powerful group homes with compensation more than five times the levels paid to family foster care providers—where 80% of foster care adoptions originate. Finally, legislative proposals to continue foster care protection past 18 years of age where youth are in school or training for meaningful employment have died.

- *Safety Net.* The state-set basic compensation for impoverished children has declined to a record low, from TANF and Food Stamps above the poverty line in the 1980s, now to 70% of the line, and the Governor proposed deeper cuts. Meanwhile, unwed births continue at a remarkable rate of 30%—with the vast majority not to teens, but to adult women. Meanwhile, child support collection from absent fathers is less than \$38 per month per child and the Governor has substantially cut the budget of the Department of Child Support Services. Collections for 2005 are estimated to be level or even lower than the minimal levels now collected for impoverished children.

- *Child Care.* While after-school and preschool programs were not cut, general child care for the working poor is inadequate and the Governor proposes radical reductions in compensation for those who care for children—to levels well below the poverty line or minimum wage. Meanwhile, the vaunted Proposition 49 after-school care upon which the Governor’s “child advocate” reputation rests remains moribund.

- *K–12 Education.* The new budget cuts education to well below the constitutional minimum guarantee as enacted by the electorate in 1988. As noted above, it occurs against a base of disinvestment moving the state to 44th nationally as of 2001. The changes in 2003 and in the legislatively-enacted budget in 2004 likely bring the state to 49th nationally in spending, and 49th in class size.

- *Higher Education.* Despite substantial fee and tuition increases, the capacity of higher education is subject to unprecedented constriction. A much smaller proportion of 18-year-olds will have UC and State College opportunity—at the very time future employment prospects require it.

Legislative Arena

The budgetary performance described above had extreme effects on legislation in general. When such deficits occur, they lead to child-related legislation following this path: (1) The measure is introduced with congratulatory press releases by the author and sponsor; (2) it receives unanimous and often bipartisan assent in policy committee and often through one house; (3) the Department of Finance opines that the measure involves more than \$150,000 in public expense (and almost any legislative measure can be so interpreted); and (5) the bill is then deposited into what is termed the “Suspense File” of the Appropriations Committee of the Senate or Assembly, and there it dies without public vote. This process led to the demise of over twenty important measures in 2002, and a similar number in 2003. By 2004, most authors had ceased the make-work of attempting to introduce constructive legislation to improve the efficacy of services to children—knowing these measures were bound for the ignominy of suspense file termination.

Although the legislative arena lacked the import of prior years, several initiatives were addressed:

- The effort to establish universal preschool continued from the previous legislative year and seemed to be gaining momentum. After a March ballot initiative to

create universal preschool faltered, Assemblymembers Darrell Steinberg (D-Sacramento) and Wilma Chan (D-Oakland) reasserted their commitment to their universal preschool bill, AB 56. Negotiations on the issue continued well into the last month of the legislative session, with apparent success. Steinberg, who was Chair of the Assembly Budget Committee, succeeded in putting money into the budget to be used to implement the bill. However, the funding did not survive the budget process. Ultimately, it became clear that the Governor was not ready to sign a far reaching universal preschool bill. The momentum for the bill sputtered out at the end of session, and the Governor's proposal to change the date for kindergarten entry would move school preparation in the opposite direction by eliminating tens of thousands of five-year-olds from kindergarten entry.

- Assemblymember Marco Antonio Firebaugh (D-South Gate) authored a bill that would have prohibited smoking in a car when there was a child in a car seat present. Though there was no official opposition to the bill, it was killed by the Legislature three different times. The first two times, Firebaugh skillfully maneuvered the legislative process to resurrect the idea in another bill. However, the third attempt was unsuccessful and the bill died by one vote in the Assembly Governmental Organization Committee.

- The modest successes for children from the Legislative session, i.e., those bills approved by the Legislature and "enrolled" to the Governor for his signature or veto, are highlighted in the "Subjects Graded" section of this Report Card.

The end result of the current financial conundrum is the general failure of the Legislature to enact a meaningful number of significant bills. Indeed, most legislation relevant to children is reduced to symbolic form or to the initiation of the ubiquitous "study." The substantive level of child-related legislation has declined to the point that this Report Card includes most major bills reaching the floor of both houses—and their significance is more minimal than at any time since CAI's formation in 1989. That decline in substantive character occurs in a setting of recurring child poverty, declining education spending, general child disinvestment, and constriction of county finances upon which child mental health, protection from abuse, emergency room coverage of children without health insurance, and other services for children depend. And perhaps most troubling, the spending forward of funds that has become the hallmark of both the Davis and now the Schwarzenegger Administrations promises many years of continued shortfall and state non-feasance toward the state's children and her future.

Because of these trends and performance, this *Children's Legislative Report Card* will begin a new method of calculating votes. All of the Senators will be assessed a negative vote for children for each major measure killed in the Suspense File without vote in the Senate Appropriations Committee, and the Assemblymembers will suffer similar deductions for measures killed in the Suspense File of the Assembly Appropriations Committee. During 2004, we apply this rule to only four measures, but note that it could apply to over twenty measures in prior years. The point of the deduction is to hold public officials accountable, however minimally, for their institution's structural rules allowing the defeat of measures without public vote. In theory, any member could move the entire body to release a Suspense File-killed measure for public vote. Accordingly, all will be held accountable for the defeat of each one where such a vote is avoided.

Government Restructuring Proposals

The Governor's budget included policy changes beyond those enumerated above—few of them beneficial to children. They include the appointment of a California Performance Review (CPR) Commission to restructure and streamline state government. The proposals emanating from this process will be introduced during the 2005 session. The early indications are dismal for children. Initial recommendations include the transfer of authority from boards and commissions that must meet and make decisions in public, and that carryover between administrations for continuity—to new “departments” whose heads make decisions in the privacy of their offices in private, and who serve at the pleasure of the Governor.

CPR recommendations also include depriving impoverished families of the first \$50 in child support collection now sent to families before recompensing the state for TANF support. That payment is a modest but important benefit for these families and provides added incentive to assist the state in collection and for fathers to make payments since at least some of it accrues to the child.

The CPR recommendations do include a number of recommendations that could have beneficial impact for children, depending critically upon their details which have yet to be decided. As part of its governmental review process, the new Administration launched into a broad analysis of California's Medi-Cal system in the hopes of reigning in some of the cost. This process, which was dubbed the Medi-Cal Redesign, began in conjunction with the budget process and is also ongoing.

Although many of the CPR recommendations consisted of admonitions to comply with federal standards and to seek maximum federal monies where available to the state, they miss the largest opportunities for such savings. As the discussion above suggests, the largest single failure to capture federal money in the nation's history (failure to claim State Child Health Insurance Program money for child health coverage at a 2–1 federal match) could be manageably prevented with true presumptive eligibility for children, and would accomplish momentous streamlining and elimination of social workers and red tape. One problem with the CPR's recommendations is the underlying mission—to avoid at all costs any expenditure of monies not now being expended for any purpose, whatever the benefits to children or the long-run savings. The prime directive of the Schwarzenegger Administration to date has not been children or investment in the future, but the protection of tax cuts. While the Legislature has been unwilling or unable to chart a different course, it has moderated the extreme cuts. The end result of this interaction has been the deferral of obligation many years into the future. This continuing structural shortfall yields likely gridlock and continued child disinvestment for at least the next five to ten years, as discussed above.

Two weeks after the CPR report's release, hearings began around the state to provide an opportunity for public comment. Advocates were frustrated by the limited access afforded at these hearings and the inability to truly deal in detail with the issues. Each hearing had an invited panel and then public testimony. For any of the witnesses the most time allowed for testimony was five minutes. The hearings will soon conclude, and questions remain about implementation of the CPR recommendations, since most will require legislative change.

Conclusion

The legislative and budget year largely saw the status quo maintained for California's children. Most programs of consequence to children staved off potentially devastating budget cuts. There was little significant progress made on the legislative front, but little lost ground. Unfortunately, status quo is not meeting the needs of California children. Our education system is not up to par, an issue that continues to resonate with Californians. Almost one million children remain uninsured. Too many foster children are not having their basic needs met and are at great risk of becoming homeless or unemployed upon leaving the system.

California's children need real leadership on their behalf. Though there are shining individual examples of leadership on behalf of children, it is largely missing from the Legislature as an institution. And regrettably, Governor Schwarzenegger has yet to live up to his campaign assertion of being a child advocate.

Subjects Graded 2003 BILLS

CHILD POVERTY

SB 339 (Alpert) would have enacted the Private Child Support Collection Act, to address the growing number of complaints about private child support collectors involving excessive fees, false and deceptive advertising, and the failure to disclose important rights forfeited by child support obligees when they assign these debts to private companies. Among other things, the measure would have regulated private child support collectors by setting their fees, requiring specified disclosures to potential clients, permitting cancellation of contracts under certain circumstances, and regulating advertising.

STATUS: On September 30, 2004, this bill was vetoed by the Governor, who found some of the provisions in this bill to be "particularly onerous to the industry and to parents seeking choices."

AB 2669 (Garcia) implements many of the recommendations from the "Collectibility Study" mandated by SB 542 (Burton) (Chapter 480, Statutes of 1999). The most significant provision of AB 2669 changes the order in which child support payments on arrears are credited to principal first, then interest, upon full implementation of the California Child Support Automation System in 2009. Currently, arrears are credited to interest first, then principal. Applying payments to principal ahead of interest allows a non-custodial parent, especially one who is also paying current support, to pay down some of the debt every month, and may prevent non-custodial parents from becoming discouraged and disappearing from their children's lives completely because they are unable to maintain their debt service.

STATUS: This bill was signed by the Governor on August 24, 2004 (Chapter 305, Statutes of 2004).

AB 2832 (Lieber) would have increased the minimum wage from \$6.75 per hour to \$7.25 as of January 1, 2005, and \$7.75 as of January 1, 2006. Although it is higher than the federal minimum wage of \$5.75, California's current minimum wage of \$6.75 per hour is the lowest on the West Coast. The California Budget Project estimates that over 58% of minimum wage earners in California are 25 years of age and

older. Increasing the minimum wage would have helped boost the incomes for California's lowest-paid working families, who are abundantly represented in the ranks of minimum wage workers, while reducing their reliance on publicly funded safety net programs to help meet their basic needs.

STATUS: On September 18, 2004, this bill was vetoed by the Governor, who viewed the measure as a barrier to his goal of making California more business-friendly.

CHILD HEALTH / SAFETY

SB 379 (Ortiz) would have required hospitals to (1) establish a charity care policy for the provision of low cost care for qualifying patients; (2) inform such patients of their rights and the financial options available to them to pay their hospital bills; and (3) make a good faith effort to negotiate a payment plan with self-pay patients before sending their outstanding bill to collections. These provisions would have helped prevent the likely financial hardship that uninsured Californians, 80% of whom are from working families, face when seeking medical care. It also would have removed a barrier to accessing care, since the prospect of hardship deters people from seeking much needed care.

STATUS: On September 22, 2004, this bill was vetoed by the Governor, who preferred to allow the hospital community to continue to implement its recently adopted voluntary guidelines.

SB 1196 (Cedillo) expands Express Enrollment, which allows the use of National School Lunch Program application information to determine Medi-Cal eligibility, to Healthy Families and any other county or locally-sponsored health insurance program when the child does not qualify for Medi-Cal; however, the information may only be so utilized upon parental consent. This will efficiently connect some of California's one million uninsured children to existing health coverage.

STATUS: This bill was signed by the Governor on September 24, 2004 (Chapter 729, Statutes of 2004).

AB 1793 (Yee) requires video game retailers to post a sign that informs consumers about the video game rating system, and to make a brochure available to consumers, upon request, that explains the rating system. This will help educate parents about the video game rating system and aid in the selection of appropriate games for their children.

STATUS: This bill was signed by the Governor on September 21, 2004 (Chapter 630, Statutes of 2004).

CHILD CARE

SB 1343 (Escutia) would have required the Superintendent of Public Instruction to establish a taskforce to develop an Infant and Toddler Care Master Plan, which would include (among other things) identification of broad state policy goals making high quality and affordable child care and development services for children through age three available for every California family. It also would have included a framework of specific actions needed to accomplish the goals; strategies to target underserved communities, families and children; efforts to mitigate deficiencies in resources available for current child care needs for infants and toddlers; and an estimate of the cost of providing high quality child care in center-based facilities and homes. A Master Plan would help California address the growing and largely unmet need of child care for infants and toddlers in a deliberate, holistic way.

STATUS: On September 29, 2004, this bill was vetoed by the Governor, who felt it was duplicative of existing policy.

AB 72 (Bates) requires each child care resource and referral agency to remove from the program's referral list a licensed child day care facility that has a revocation or temporary suspension order or is on probation. Child care resource and referral programs help parents find child care programs to meet their needs. This measure will give parents greater assurance that referred providers meet the state's licensing requirements.

STATUS: This measure was signed by the Governor on August 27, 2004 (Chapter 358, Statutes of 2004).

SB 1421 (Vasconcellos) would have required—commencing with the 2009–10 school year—that all pupils, prior to high school graduation, receive instruction in parenting education in either a home economics course or the existing one-semester course in American government and civics required for graduation. Though parenting education lessons should be interspersed throughout the seventh through twelfth grade curricula, this bill would have been an important step toward ensuring that youth receive education about the most important personal and civic responsibility they may take on—and toward ensuring that children have parents who are prepared for the role of parenthood.

STATUS: This bill was passed by the Senate but died in the Assembly Appropriations' suspense file.

AB 825 (Firebaugh). Existing law establishes a variety of public education programs with specific criteria for eligibility and rules regarding the use of funds provided for those programs. These categorical programs are established to assure that education resources are used to meet specific pupil, school, or school district needs. This bill consolidates a total of 22 K–12 education categorical funding programs and most supplemental instruction hourly reimbursement programs into six categorical block grants effective with the 2005–06 fiscal year. This will give school districts more flexibility in providing programs while protecting the major program funding categories, thus enabling school districts to focus on serving student needs instead of bureaucracy.

STATUS: This bill was signed by the Governor on September 29, 2004 (Chapter 871, Statutes of 2004).

AB 1897 (Reyes) would have required, beginning July 1, 2005, each school district with one or more high schools to appoint a preferential voting pupil member to the governing board of the school district. According to the California School Boards Association, approximately half of California's school boards lack a student member to represent their students. This bill would have helped ensure that student voices are represented in decisions directly affecting them, and would have stimulated youth leadership.

STATUS: On September 24, 2004, this bill was vetoed by the Governor, who opined that "mandating that school districts appoint a preferential voting student member to local school board is unnecessary since existing law already provides a mechanism for student representation on local school boards."

AB 2559 (Diaz) would have established the Teacher Preparation and Professional Development Program Evaluation. This bill would have ensured that teachers have meaningful input and involvement in the process and content of professional development programs and could have helped identify successful development programs. More effective development training would result in better instruction for students.

STATUS: This measure was passed by the Assembly but died in the Senate Appropriations' suspense file.

CHILD PROTECTION

AB 129 (Cohn) authorizes the probation department and the child welfare services department in any county to create a protocol which would permit a minor who

meets specified criteria to be designated as a dual status child (a child who is child under the jurisdiction of both departments). Prior to this bill, only California and Colorado used an either/or approach to jurisdiction in juvenile justice cases; the other 48 states either use or have some form of dual status approach. Establishing the dual status classification in California will improve the juvenile justice system and yield valuable information about the best approaches to such cases.

STATUS: This measure was signed by the Governor on September 10, 2004 (Chapter 468, Statutes of 2004).

AB 488 (Parra) requires the Department of Justice to establish an Internet site disclosing information pertaining to registered sex offenders beginning on or before July 1, 2005. This measure will help ensure that parents have easy access to information that will aid them in protecting their children from registered sex offenders in their communities.

STATUS: This bill was signed by the Governor on September 24, 2004 (Chapter 745, Statutes of 2004).

AB 1895 (Nation), among other things, would have required the juvenile court to appoint an immigration attorney to a dependent child who is not a U.S. citizen or a lawful permanent resident and is unable to reunify with his/her parents, if the court determines that it is in the child's best interests. All undocumented children within California's juvenile justice system run the risk of being deported, even when in foster care, guardianship, or after adoption. However, they are eligible for special juvenile immigrant status (SJIS), which would protect against deportation and provides a streamlined process for obtaining permanent residence. SJIS requires timely application, which an immigration attorney would help facilitate. SJIS status will help increase successful, permanent placements for these children.

STATUS: On September 30, 2004, this bill was vetoed by Governor Schwarzenegger, who opined that the measure was unnecessary because "[c]ounties already have the option of appointing an attorney to assist in resolving the immigration status of a child."

AB 2496 (S. Horton) creates the Child Welfare Services (CWS) Program Improvement Fund in the State Treasury to receive grants, gifts, or bequests made to the state from private sources; instructs the Department of Social Services to use the money, to the extent possible, as a match to obtain federal dollars; and specifies that moneys received through this fund shall be used to augment federal, state or county funds made available for the CWS Program Improvement Fund. This fund will help capitalize on the philanthropic community's desire to contribute to the improvement of CWS and expand the funding available for the ongoing efforts.

STATUS: This bill was signed by the Governor on July 15, 2004 (Chapter 168, Statutes of 2004).

SB 693 (Murray) would have established the position of Undersecretary of Foster Care Coordination within the State Health and Human Services Agency, and directed the Undersecretary to coordinate the activities of state and local agencies that provide for the needs of children placed in foster care. Currently, numerous state agencies have some responsibility for providing services to foster children, including the state Departments of Social Services, Health Services, Mental Health, Development Services, Alcohol and Drug Programs, Justice, and Education. Consolidated statewide leadership would improve accountability for programs serving foster youth and could greatly improve outcomes for the youth.

STATUS: This measure was passed by the Senate but died in the Assembly Appropriations' suspense file.

JUVENILE JUSTICE

SB 449 (Escutia) would have required the juvenile court to take the educational needs of a minor into consideration when making any orders related to the care

of the minor. It also would have required the required probation officer's social study to include a description of the minor's educational needs and recommendations for meeting those needs and, when possible, preserving the stability of the minor's educational program. The bill would have established additional provisions to maintain a minor's access to and stability of his/her educational needs. Thus, this bill would have helped ensure that delinquent youth receive basic educational instruction, which is one of the foundations of rehabilitation, the basis for the juvenile system.

STATUS: On September 30, 2004, this bill was vetoed by the Governor because it would have added additional responsibilities to county courts and probation departments, and would have cancelled out portions of a bill he signed earlier.

SB 1151 (Kuehl) would have clarified the definition of the term "circumstances and gravity of the offense" for purposes of evaluating whether a juvenile should be tried in juvenile court or moved to adult criminal court. Specifically, this bill would have provided that the legal standard of the circumstances and gravity of the offense includes the actual alleged behavior of the minor; the minor's degree of involvement in the crime; the level of harm actually caused by the minor; and any other matter that may affect the circumstances and gravity of the offenses.

Because current law does not specify how a court should evaluate the circumstances and gravity of the offense, inconsistent fitness determinations are being made by juvenile courts throughout the state. By providing specific criteria for courts consider, this bill would have helped ensure consistency in the types of cases being transferred from juvenile court to adult criminal court, and would have ensured that only the most appropriate cases are moved into the adult system.

STATUS: On August 27, 2004, this measure was vetoed by the Governor, who opined that it would "prohibit[] some of the most serious juvenile offenders from being treated as adults in the criminal justice system."

MISCELLANEOUS

SB 215 (Alpert). The lack of coordination among agencies and organizations that serve children and youth often prevents them from receiving the services they need and the experiences necessary for successful development. California youth would be better served if programs and activities to improve their well-being were guided by a coordinating structure, led by the Governor, to increase the coherence and effectiveness of policies and practices, and that specify clearly stated outcomes. Accordingly, this bill would have enacted the Youth Policy Act and created the California Youth Policy Council (CYPC) to coordinate state policy regarding youth development and prevention efforts affecting youth.

STATUS: On September 29, 2004, this bill was vetoed by the Governor, who opined that "[t]he establishment of a new council is not necessary as the Legislature and the Administration can create councils to advise them without statutory authority."

AB 292 (Yee) would have prohibited government agencies, and public or private entities that receive state funding, from using any child (under age 15) as an interpreter in business matters. Children should not bear the responsibility of translating information about serious and complex issues like domestic violence, health issues, or family concerns, a practice that persists despite requirements that public agencies employ interpreters.

STATUS: This measure was passed by the Assembly but died in the Senate Appropriations' Committee.

How Legislators Were Graded

METHODOLOGY

All the bills included in this *Report Card* would improve current law for children. An “AYE” vote on these measures represents a vote for children and is indicated by a “★.” “NO” votes and abstentions are noted with a “–,” indicating the legislator was “not there” for children. Abstentions count against a legislator’s score because a legislator who fails to vote effectively votes “NO.” In cases where a legislator had an excused absence when the floor vote was taken (for illness, legislative business, etc.), the vote will be noted with a “–*” but will count as a “NO” vote for purposes of the legislator’s total grade. Bills held in the suspense file of the Senate or Assembly Appropriations Committee will be noted with –**; for our purposes, each and every legislator’s failure to pull the bill from suspense qualifies as a “NO.” Vacancies in a legislative seat are noted with a “V.”

- ★ means **A VOTE FOR CHILDREN**
(an “aye” vote)
- means **NOT THERE FOR CHILDREN**
(a “no” vote or abstention)
- * means **EXCUSED ABSENCE**
(illness, legislative business, etc.; counts as a NO vote)
- ** means **HELD IN SUSPENSE**
(counts as a NO vote)
- V means **VACANT SEAT**

The *2004 Children’s Legislative Report Card* evaluates final floor votes on selected bills affecting children. When bills were amended in the second house, the concurrence vote in the house of origin was used to compute those legislators’ scores, so that comparing Senate and Assembly votes on the same bills will reflect votes on the same version of the bill. Where a bill was passed by one house but held in the suspense file of the other house, legislators in the bill’s house of origin receive the grade reflecting their floor vote; legislators in the second house receive the equivalent of a “NO” vote for failing to pull the bill from suspense for a public vote.

Legislators’ overall scores indicate the percentage of affirmatively cast votes for children on the legislation presented. Votes and attendance were tallied from the Assembly and Senate Daily Journals and the Legislative Counsel’s website (www.leginfo.ca.gov).

CHILDREN'S LEGISLATIVE REPORT CARD

2004 REPORT

	Legislator	POVERTY			HEALTH/SAFETY			CHILD CARE		JUVENILE JUSTICE		
		SB 339 (Alpert)	AB 2669 (Garcia)	AB 2832 (Lieber)	SB 379 (Ortiz)	SB 1196 (Cedillo)	AB 1793 (Yee)	SB 1343 (Escutia)	AB 72 (Bates)	SB 449 (Escutia)	SB 1151 (Kuehl)	
SENATORS	Aanestad	-	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	★	
	Ackerman	-	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-	
	Alarcon	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	
	Alpert	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	
	Ashburn	-	★	-	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
	Battin	-	★	-	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
	Bowen	-	★	★	-	★	★	★	★	★	-	★
	Brulte	-	★	-	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
	Burton	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
	Cedillo	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
	Chesbro	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
	Denham	-	★	-	-	-	★	-	-	★	-	-
	Ducheny	★	★	-	-	★	★	-	★	★	★	★
	Dunn	★	-*	★	★	★	★	★	★	-	★	-
	Escutia	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
	Figueroa	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
	Florez	★	★	★	-	-	★	★	★	★	★	★
	Hollingsworth	-	★	-	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
	Johnson	-	★	-	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
	Karnette	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
	Knight ¹	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
	Kuehl	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	-	★	★	★
	Machado	★	★	★	★	★	★	-	★	★	★	★
	Margett	-	★	-	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
	McClintock	-	★	-	-	-	-	-	-	★	★	-
	McPherson	-	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	★	-	★
	Morrow	-	★	-	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
	Murray	-	★	★	-	★	★	★	★	★	-	★
	Oller	-	★	-	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
	Ortiz	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
	Perata	★	★	-	-	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
	Poochigian	-	★	-	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
	Romero	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Scott	★	★	★	-	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	
Sher	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	-	
Soto	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	
Speier	★	★	★	★	★	★	-	★	★	★	★	
Torlakson	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	
Vasconcellos	-	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	-	★	
Vincent ²	-*	-*	-*	-	-*	-*	-*	-*	-*	-*	★	

ASSEMBLYMEMBERS	Aghazarian	★	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-	
	Bates	★	★	-	-	-	★	-	★	-	-	
	Benoit	★	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-	
	Berg	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	
	Bermudez	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	
	Bogh	★	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-	
	Calderon	★	-*	★	-	★	-	-	★	★	★	-*
	Campbell	-	★	-	-	-	-*	-	-	★	-	-
	Canciamilla	-	★	★	★	★	★	-	★	★	★	-
	Chan	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	-*	★	★
	Chavez	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
	Chu	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
	Cogdill	★	★	-	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
	Cohn	★	★	★	★	★	★	-	★	★	★	★
	Corbett	★	-	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
	Correa	★	★	★	-	★	★	★	★	★	★	-
	Cox	★	★	-	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
	Daucher	★	★	-	-	★	★	★	★	★	-	-
	Diaz	★	★	★	-	★	★	★	★	★	★	★

★ : A VOTE FOR CHILDREN (an "aye" vote) - : NOT THERE FOR CHILDREN (a "no" vote or abstention)

	EDUCATION				CHILD PROTECTION	MISCELLANEOUS	2004 Votes for Children	2004 Grade	Legislator					
	SB 1421 (Vasconcellos)	AB 825 (Firebaugh)	AB 1895 (Nation)	AB 2559 (Diaz)						AB 129 (Cohn)	AB 488 (Parra)	AB 1895 (Nation)	AB 2496 (S. Horton)	SB 693 (Murray)
	-	*	-	-**	*	*	-	*	-	-	-**	7 of 21	33%	Aanestad
	-	*	-	-**	*	*	-	*	-	-	-**	6 of 21	29%	Ackerman
	*	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	19 of 21	90%	Alarcon
	*	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	18 of 21	86%	Alpert
	-	*	-	-**	*	*	*	*	-	-	-**	7 of 21	33%	Ashburn
	-	*	-	-**	*	*	-	*	-	-	-**	6 of 21	29%	Battin
	-	*	-	-**	*	*	*	*	*	-	-**	14 of 21	67%	Bowen
	-	*	-	-**	*	*	-	*	-	-	-**	6 of 21	29%	Brulte
	*	*	*	-**	*	-	*	*	*	*	-**	18 of 21	86%	Burton
	*	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	19 of 21	90%	Cedillo
	*	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	19 of 21	90%	Chesbro
	*	*	-	-**	*	*	-	*	-	-	-**	8 of 21	38%	Denham
	*	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	17 of 21	81%	Ducheny
	*	*	*	-**	-	*	*	*	-*	-	-**	14 of 21	67%	Dunn
	*	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	19 of 21	90%	Escutia
	*	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	19 of 21	90%	Figueroa
	-	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	17 of 21	81%	Florez
	-	*	-	-**	*	*	-	*	-	-	-**	6 of 21	29%	Hollingsworth
	-	*	-	-**	*	*	-	*	-	-	-**	6 of 21	29%	Johnson
	*	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	19 of 21	90%	Karnette
	V	V	V	-**	V	V	V	V	-	V	V	na	na	Knight ¹
	*	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	18 of 21	86%	Kuehl
	*	*	-	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	17 of 21	81%	Machado
	-	*	-	-**	*	*	-	*	-	-	-**	6 of 21	29%	Margett
	-	*	-	-**	*	*	-	*	*	*	-**	8 of 21	38%	McClintock
	*	*	*	-**	*	*	-	*	-	-	-**	10 of 21	48%	McPherson
	-	*	-	-**	*	*	-	*	-	-	-**	6 of 21	29%	Morrow
	*	*	-	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	15 of 21	71%	Murray
	-	*	-	-**	*	*	-	*	-	-	-**	6 of 21	29%	Oller
	-	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	18 of 21	86%	Ortiz
	*	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	18 of 21	86%	Perata
	-	*	-	-**	*	*	-	*	-	-	-**	6 of 21	29%	Poochigian
	*	*	*	-**	*	-	*	-*	*	*	-**	17 of 21	81%	Romero
	*	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	18 of 21	86%	Scott
	*	*	*	-**	*	-	*	*	*	*	-**	17 of 21	81%	Sher
	*	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	19 of 21	90%	Soto
	-	*	-	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	16 of 21	76%	Speier
	*	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	19 of 21	90%	Torlakson
	*	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	16 of 21	76%	Vasconcellos
	*	*	-*	-**	-*	-*	-	*	*	-*	-**	5 of 21	24%	Vincent ²

	-**	*	-	-	*	*	-	*	-**	-	-	7 of 21	33%	Aghazarian
	-**	*	-	-	*	*	-	*	-**	-	-	8 of 21	38%	Bates
	-**	*	-	-	*	*	-	*	-**	-	-	7 of 21	33%	Benoit
	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Berg
	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Bermudez
	-**	*	-	-	*	*	-	*	-**	-	-	7 of 21	33%	Bogh
	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	*	-*	14 of 21	67%	Calderon
	-**	*	-	-	*	*	-	*	-**	-	-	6 of 21	29%	Campbell
	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	*	-	15 of 21	71%	Canciamilla
	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	*	*	18 of 21	86%	Chan
	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Chavez
	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Chu
	-**	*	-	-	*	*	-	*	-**	-	-	7 of 21	33%	Cogdill
	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	*	*	18 of 21	86%	Cohn
	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	*	*	18 of 21	86%	Corbett
	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	*	*	17 of 21	81%	Correa
	-**	*	-	-	*	*	-	*	-**	-	-	7 of 21	33%	Cox
	-**	*	-	-	*	*	*	*	-**	-	-	11 of 21	52%	Daucher
	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-**	*	*	18 of 21	86%	Diaz

-* : EXCUSED ABSENCE

V : VACANT SEAT

-** HELD IN SUSPENSE

1. Senator Knight passed away on May 7, 2004.

2. A family member's illness caused Senator Vincent to miss several floor votes in 2004.

CHILDREN'S LEGISLATIVE REPORT CARD

2004 REPORT

Legislator	POVERTY			HEALTH/SAFETY			CHILD CARE		JUVENILE JUSTICE	
	SB 339 (Alpert)	AB 2669 (Garcia)	AB 2632 (Lieber)	SB 379 (Ortiz)	SB 1196 (Cedillo)	AB 1793 (Yee)	SB 1343 (Escutia)	AB 72 (Bates)	SB 449 (Escutia)	SB 1151 (Kuehl)
Dutra	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Dutton	★	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
Dymally	★	-	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Firebaugh	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Frommer	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	-
Garcia	★	★	-	-	★	★	-	★	-	-
Goldberg	★	★	★	★	★	-	★	★	★	★
Hancock	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Harman	★	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
Haynes	-	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
J. Horton	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
S. Horton	★	★	-	-	★	★	-	★	-	-
Houston	★	★	-	-	-	★	-	★	-	-
Jackson	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Keene	★	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
Kehoe	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Koretz ³	- [*]	★	- [*]	- [*]	★	★	- [*]	★	★	★
La Suer	★	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
Laird	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
LaMalfa	★	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
Leno	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Leslie	★	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
Levine	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Lieber	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Liu	★	★	★	★	★	-	★	★	★	★
Longville	★	★	★	★	★	-	★	★	★	★
Lowenthal	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Maddox	★	★	-	-	★	-	-	★	-	-
Maldonado	★	★	-	-	★	★	★	★	-	-
Matthews	★	★	-	★	★	-	★	★	★	★
Maze	★	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
McCarthy	★	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
Montanez	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Mountjoy	★	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
Mullin	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Nakanishi	★	★	-	-	★	★	-	★	-	-
Nakano	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	-
Nation	★	★	★	-	★	★	★	★	★	★
Negrete McLeod	-	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Nunez	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Oropeza	★	- [*]	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	- [*]
Pacheco	★	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
Parra	★	★	★	★	★	-	★	★	★	★
Pavley	-	★	★	★	★	★	-	★	★	★
Plescia	★	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
Reyes	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Richman	★	★	-	-	★	★	★	★	-	-
Ridley-Thomas	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Runner	★	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
Salinas	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Samuelian	★	★	-	-	-	★	-	★	-	-
Simitian	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Spitzer	★	★	-	-	-	★	-	★	-	-
Steinberg	★	★	★	-	★	★	★	★	★	★
Strickland	★	★	-	-	-	-	-	★	-	-
Vargas	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Wesson	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Wiggins	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Wolk	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★
Wyland	★	★	-	-	-	★	-	★	-	-
Yee	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★	★

ASSEMBLY MEMBERS

★ : A VOTE FOR CHILDREN (an "aye" vote) - : NOT THERE FOR CHILDREN (a "no" vote or abstention)

	EDUCATION				CHILD PROTECTION				MISCELLANEOUS		2004 Votes for Children	2004 Grade	Legislator	
	SB 1421 (Vasconcellos)	AB 825 (Firebaugh)	AB 1895 (Nation)	AB 2559 (Diaz)	AB 129 (Cohn)	AB 488 (Parra)	AB 1895 (Nation)	AB 2495 (S. Horton)	SB 693 (Murray)	SB 215 (Alpert)				AB 292 (Yee)
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Dutra
	—**	—	—	—	*	*	—	*	—**	—	—	6 of 21	29%	Dutton
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	18 of 21	86%	Dymally
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Firebaugh
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	18 of 21	86%	Frommer
	—**	*	—	—	*	*	*	*	—**	—	—	10 of 21	48%	Garcia
	—**	*	*	*	*	—	*	*	—**	*	*	17 of 21	81%	Goldberg
	—**	*	*	*	*	—	*	*	—**	*	*	18 of 21	86%	Hancock
	—**	*	—	—	*	*	*	*	—**	—	—	8 of 21	38%	Harman
	—**	—	—	—	*	*	—	*	—**	—	—	5 of 21	24%	Haynes
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	—	18 of 21	86%	J. Horton
	—**	*	*	—	*	*	*	*	—**	*	—	12 of 21	57%	S. Horton
	—**	*	—	—	*	*	—	*	—**	—	—	8 of 21	38%	Houston
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Jackson
	—**	—	—	—	*	*	—	*	—**	—	—	6 of 21	29%	Keene
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Kehoe
	—**	*	—*	*	*	—*	—*	*	—**	—*	—*	10 of 21	48%	Koretz ³
	—**	*	—	—	—	*	—	*	—**	—	—	6 of 21	29%	La Suer
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Laird
	—**	—	—	—	*	*	—	*	—**	—	—	6 of 21	29%	LaMalfa
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	—	*	—**	*	*	18 of 21	86%	Leno
	—**	*	—	—	*	*	—	*	—**	—	—	7 of 21	33%	Leslie
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Levine
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Lieber
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	18 of 21	86%	Liu
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	18 of 21	86%	Longville
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Lowenthal
	—**	*	—	—	*	*	—	*	—**	—	—	8 of 21	38%	Maddox
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	—	14 of 21	67%	Maldonado
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	—	16 of 21	76%	Matthews
	—**	—	—	—	*	*	*	*	—**	—	—	7 of 21	33%	Maze
	—**	—	—	—	*	*	—	*	—**	—	—	6 of 21	29%	McCarthy
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Montanez
	—**	*	—	—	*	*	—	*	—**	—	—	7 of 21	33%	Mountjoy
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Mullin
	—**	*	—	—	*	*	—	*	—**	—	—	9 of 21	43%	Nakanishi
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	18 of 21	86%	Nakano
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	18 of 21	86%	Nation
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	18 of 21	86%	Negrete McLeod
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Nunez
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	17 of 21	81%	Oropeza
	—**	*	—	—	*	*	—	*	—**	—	—	7 of 21	33%	Pacheco
	—**	*	*	—	*	*	*	*	—**	*	—	16 of 21	76%	Parra
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	—	*	16 of 21	76%	Pavley
	—**	*	—	—	*	*	—	*	—**	—	—	7 of 21	33%	Plescia
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Reyes
	—**	*	—	—	*	*	*	—*	—**	—	—	10 of 21	48%	Richman
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Ridley-Thomas
	—**	—	—	—	*	*	—	*	—**	—	—	6 of 21	29%	Runner
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Salinas
	—**	*	—	—	*	*	—	*	—**	—	—	8 of 21	38%	Samuelian
	—**	*	—	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	—	17 of 21	81%	Simitian
	—**	*	—	—	*	*	—	*	—**	—	*	9 of 21	43%	Spitzer
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	18 of 21	86%	Steinberg
	—**	*	—	—	*	*	—	*	—**	—	—	7 of 21	33%	Strickland
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Vargas
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Wesson
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Wiggins
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Wolk
	—**	*	—	—	*	*	—	*	—**	—	—	8 of 21	38%	Wyland
	—**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	—**	*	*	19 of 21	90%	Yee

—* : EXCUSED ABSENCE

V : VACANT SEAT

—** HELD IN SUSPENSE

3. A family member's illness caused Assemblymember Koretz to miss several floor votes in 2004.



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