

CHILDREN'S LEGISLATIVE REPORT CARD

LEGISLATIVE SESSION: 2005–06

REPORT CARD TERM: 2005


Dear Californians,

This *Report Card* reflects the grades attributed to California legislators for their votes on child-related legislation during the first year of the 2005–06 legislative session. The grades you will see reflect each legislator's votes on 18 bills that ran through policy and fiscal committees and achieved votes on both the Assembly and Senate floors. This *Report Card* also includes two additional bills, one of which was passed by the Assembly but died in the Suspense File of the Senate Appropriations Committee, and one of which was passed by the Senate, but died in the Suspense File of the Assembly Appropriations Committee. For those measures, legislators in the house of origin receive the vote they earned while voting on the measure, and legislators in the other house receive a "no" vote—reflecting the fact that each legislator in that house allowed the bill to die in the Suspense File without an affirmative vote. Thus, this *Report Card* reflects each legislator's actions on 20 total measures.


The year will be remembered as the short rise and apparently long fall of the Schwarzenegger Administration. The Governor's term has been characterized by his radical absolutism against new revenues—except for new revenues generated from increased tuition, child care and foster care licensing fees, and medical premiums/copays for the working poor, that is. For the past year, the Governor has consistently appealed to perceived popular self-interest, telling folks what he thinks they want to hear (*e.g.*, that the problem is Sacramento overspending). In fact, special tax breaks—mostly for the wealthy—now total \$30 billion per year, with the Governor's own evisceration of the longstanding Vehicle License Fee a major contributor. Total state spending on children, as a percentage of personal income, is \$13 billion less today than it was in 1977. Our school spending is in the bottom third of the nation, and our average class size ranks 49th. Meanwhile, the Congress cut taxes in 2001 and 2003, notwithstanding a war on terror and the country's ongoing involvement in Iraq. Those tax cuts save California adults an average of \$37 billion per year in tax forbearance to 2013—and more thereafter. Regrettably, the state has failed to capture any of that reduction to help meet its budget shortfall. And both California and federal officials continue to push many billions of dollars forward in accounting devices, deficits, and future payroll Social Security/Medicare obligations for our children to pay. While the Governor laments the excessive influence of the public employee lobbies at the Capitol—perhaps a valid complaint—his own business financiers do not reflect our highest aspirations, either.

This *Report Card* is intended to educate and inform you of your legislators' actions; regrettably, those actions do not indicate widespread legislative fiscal courage or commitment to children. This *Report Card* cannot tell you all there is to know about your legislators. Accordingly, we urge you to communicate frequently with them so they know your expectations of them for California's children. We also urge you to communicate with your Governor—whose budget policies inhibited most of the significant child-friendly measures from reaching his desk, and who then vetoed 39% of those that did.

Sincerely,




Robert C. Fellmeth
Executive Director, Children's Advocacy Institute



A Primer THE LEGISLATIVE PROCESS

After introduction by a legislator, a bill is heard in the appropriate policy committee(s), and if it has a fiscal impact is then heard in the Appropriations Committee in the house of origin (either Assembly or Senate). If a bill passes those committees, it is next voted upon by all members of that house (the “floor vote”). If the bill passes a floor vote in the house of origin, it then goes to the other house and begins the process all over again (policy committee(s), Appropriations Committee, and floor vote). At any of these points, the bill may be changed or “amended.” If the bill is amended in the second house, it must return for a second vote on the floor of the house of origin (the “concurrence vote”).

Once a bill passes both houses of the Legislature (and, if necessary, passes a concurrence vote in the house of origin), the Governor may sign it into law, veto it, or take no action within the constitutionally-prescribed time limit, thereby allowing it to become law without his/her signature. The only change a Governor may make in a bill, without sending it back to the Legislature, is to reduce or eliminate the money allocated in the bill.



Legislative Report Card 2005

THE YEAR IN REVIEW

After a transitional year in 2004, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger began settling into his role as Governor in 2005. While his first year was spent building his Administrative team and touting a message of reform, it was not until 2005 that his political philosophy resulted in an articulated platform.

Until early 2005, much of the Governor's reform efforts—and the advocacy community's focus—had revolved around the budget process and the Governor's California Performance Review (CPR), a mechanism intended to analyze government performance and processes and recommend ways to achieve greater efficiencies. A team of reassigned state employees were sequestered to undertake the review in early 2004. This effort produced the California Performance Review report in August 2004; the phone book-sized report included various policy recommendations, as well as recommendations for organizational restructuring of state government.

A Governor-appointed Commission quickly undertook the task of reviewing the proposals with an eye toward implementation in 2005. The Commission's review included hearings with public input. Each hearing focused on discrete parts of the report, and the first of the hearings was scheduled two weeks after the report's release. Each witness was allowed just five minutes—at most—to comment. All hearings were conducted, and all written comments were required to be submitted, within two months of the report's release. The incongruity of seeking expansive governmental reform and reorganization with such limited time for discussion and consideration undermined the effort's credibility.

Additionally, a review of the child-related proposals did little to assure advocates that children's best interests were being considered. For example, one recommendation (HHS 10) proposed the elimination of the \$50 child support income that families receiving income assistance may disregard in their grant determination. This change would have been a blow to children in low-income families. First, it would have resulted in a loss of an important economic support for them. Also, it could have undermined the psychological connection created when a parent knows that monetary support paid is going directly to his/her child, possibly impeding the parent's future participation in paying child support and in the life of the child.

Other CPR recommendations were more child-friendly, but were replete with limitations that would hinder their implementation and/or efficacy. For example, HHS 08 recommended that a single person or organization within the state be appointed the state leader of foster care. September 1, 2004—just one month from the report's release—was the recommended deadline for this appointment. Though many advocates support vesting authority and accountability for child welfare programs in one place, the goal of finding the person with the requisite knowledge and experience to fill this position in a month appeared to be completely unrealistic.

Additionally, some recommendations seemed to contradict each other. HHS 08, discussed above, recommended that centralizing foster care under the direction of a statewide leader is necessary to help reform and improve the child welfare system. At the same time, HHS 02 recommended a funding shift that would have transferred all non-federal child welfare money to the counties for distribution.

Overall, the report was rife with contradictory policy and lacked important detail. One thing that did remain constant throughout the report was the claim that each recommendation would result in cost savings—a claim that was not always verifiable given the limited time provided for review or analysis, a problem which was exacerbated by the report’s lack of specificity regarding implementation.

The Legislature approached the CPR with a certain level of disdain and incredulity. Though they lack the tenure afforded their predecessors, current legislators have enough collective experience at policymaking to know that accomplishing sweeping changes requires formidable effort. Additionally, legislators were becoming increasingly less awestruck with the Governor and more willing to challenge him. They knew that most of the proposed changes would require legislative participation—and thus give them an opportunity to assert influence.

As 2004 closed, advocates wondered how the CPR implementation would play out. Some thought that it would fizzle under its own weight. Others thought it would provide the playbook for 2005. Governor Schwarzenegger resolved part of the question in his annual State of the State address presented in January 2005. The Governor outlined the specific areas in which he sought reform: the budget process, state pensions, the education system, the redistricting process, general government organization, and prescription drugs. Within these broad categories, he identified more focused proposals. And, though still quite ambitious, this provided more policy definition than was previously outlined by the Governor and incorporated some CPR policy.

In order to accomplish these reforms, the Governor called a special session of the Legislature. An extraordinary legislative session runs concurrent to the regular legislative session, but bills in the special session can only address issues defined by the proclamation calling the session. Additionally, any of the rules governing deadlines are expedited or void, meaning that the process can be accelerated. And the Governor, knowing this, expected legislative action on his reforms to be completed within a couple months, allowing enough time to hold an election in early summer for any changes that required voter approval. He further noted that if the Legislature was unable to move his reforms, he would take his mission to the people. More specifically, he said, “If we here in this chamber don’t work together to reform the government, the people will rise up and reform it themselves. And I will join them. And I will fight with them.” This veiled threat underscored Schwarzenegger’s willingness to use his sway with voters to circumvent the Legislature and get things accomplished. This statement foreshadowed much of what would happen in the following months.

During 2004, the Legislature appeared awestruck by the Governor’s strong popularity, and was hesitant to challenge him—especially when the Legislature’s approval rating was barely registering in polls. Thus, the Governor and the Legislature joined together to pass two initiatives addressing budget issues and issuing bonds to apply toward the state’s budget deficit. But in 2005, the Governor’s patina was beginning to tarnish, and the Legislature bristled at the Governor’s continued brashness.

Even more problematic for many in the Democratically-controlled Legislature was the Governor’s many unsubtle jabs at organized labor, a loyal Democratic supporter. For example, one of the Governor’s proposed reforms sought to change the state’s pension system from a defined benefit to a defined contribution system—a drastic change to what is regarded as hallowed ground for the large union representing state employees.

A second dig at the unions was represented through the Governor's education reform proposals. Of the many reform proposals in his package, the Governor chose to focus on changing teacher tenure in his State of the State speech. Pundits quickly agreed that this was a shot across the bow to the formidable and politically powerful teachers union. The Governor did not hesitate to pull children into that ugly fray, saying, "My colleagues, this is going to be a big political fight. This is a battle of the special interests versus the children's interests. Which will you choose?"

Despite a flurry of early action, nothing became of the special session efforts. No bill introduced in the extraordinary session was sent to the Governor.

Concurrent with the special session, the Governor was using other legislative tools to attempt to move parts of the CPR and his reform agenda. The first was the budget, discussed in detail below. The second was an obscure practice called the Governor's Reorganization Plan (GRP), a tool available to Governors for the sole purpose of making shifts in the organization of executive branch offices. No policy can be changed in a GRP. The process differs significantly from legislation. After a GRP is introduced, the Little Hoover Commission, charged with government oversight responsibilities, has 60 days to review it and submit a report on the plan to the Legislature. The Governor can submit the plan directly to the Legislature 30 days following submission to the Little Hoover Commission. If the Legislature does not vote down the plan within 60 days of its receipt, the reorganization becomes operational by law. Unlike bills, there is no opportunity for the Legislature to make amendments to a GRP.

The Governor submitted four separate GRPs to the Legislature—one on consolidating and/or eliminating various boards and commissions; one restructuring the youth and adult correctional system; one proposing to establish the Department of Technology Services; and one on energy agency consolidation. He ultimately withdrew the GRP related to boards and commissions. The Legislature accepted the GRPs to reorganize the Youth and Adult Correctional Agency and establish the Department of Technology Services, but rejected the GRP on energy agency consolidation. Although none of the GRPs dealt directly with children's issues, they forced policy-makers to divert attention from regular legislative business, sapping the already low interest in tackling hard issues that impact children.

As noted above, the budget was the other tool used by the Governor in his efforts to implement some of his reform proposals. In fact, it was in his budget that advocates caught the first glimpse of the Governor's budget reform proposal, which he titled "Live Within Our Means—The Budget Control Proposal." The Governor touted his reform and his budget by claiming that the state did not face a revenue problem, instead chiding, "California has a spending problem." He cited a \$9.1 billion shortfall between spending and revenue. Of course, he studiously avoided mentioning his contribution to this situation. His first action as Governor was to rescind the Vehicle License Fee, resulting in a loss of \$4.5 billion—half of the noted shortfall.

In addition to the reform proposal, the Governor's proposed budget included significant cuts to children's programs. One of the biggest and most hotly debated proposals included the Governor's backpedaling on his agreement with the education community the previous year. Under that agreement, education would take a \$2 billion cut for one year, but the money would be restored to the education funding base, which determines future education expenditures. However, in his 2005–06 budget proposal, the Governor continued funding schools at the previous year's level. This,

coupled with the Governor's highly contentious education reform proposals, drove a quick escalation of budget and political rhetoric. His breach of the agreement also pushed California toward the bottom—perilously close to 50th—in national charting of per pupil spending.

Schwarzenegger also proposed cutting the rates paid to child care providers, raising the fees in both the University of California and California State University systems, instituting fees in order for poor families to receive Medi-Cal, and cutting grants to families receiving CalWORKs. Individually, each budget cut proposal was onerous. Regrettably, some families would have been hit with multiple cuts. For example, a family on CalWORKs might face both a cut to their grant for basic necessities while their child care provider also received a funding cut, which could have impacted the provider's ability to continue providing service and the family's child care availability. The cumulative impact of the cuts would have been devastating.

There were some small bright spots in the Governor's proposed budget, such as proposals to fund certified application assistants who help families apply for health coverage for children, and the expansion of the newborn medical screening program. He also proposed to increase community college funding. However, in light of the expansiveness of the other proposals and the significant potential to negatively impact children's lives, these were small consolation.

In total, the Governor proposed to continue underfunding an education system that was already at the bottom of national investment comparisons, make it more difficult for low-income families to get child care and health care, cut the income assistance to families who already faced a significant shortfall between grants and the cost of living, and make it more difficult for young students to afford higher education.

Equally disheartening was a well-defined strategy to pit advocates in the health and human service areas against those in education. Health and human service advocates were told that the Governor had bestowed a favor upon them by reneging on the education agreement; if the Governor had honored his agreement to education, cuts to health and human services programs would have occurred. Instead, cuts to important health and human services programs were limited. Underlying this tactic was a desire to destabilize support around Proposition 98, the proposition establishing the funding formula for education.

The advocates held firm in resisting this ploy. Children's advocates were especially incensed by the tactic, responding that cuts to education impact the same vulnerable youth as cuts to health and human service programs. Children cannot be portioned into discrete policy areas—and neither can children's advocates.

The Legislature responded swiftly in rejecting most of the Governor's budget proposals. However, it continued to be hobbled by the ardent aversion of the Governor and Republican leadership to even consider new revenue options. Thankfully, California received a revenue windfall of \$3.9 billion from a tax amnesty program. That took a significant amount of pressure off the budget deliberations and provided the Legislature some leeway in making budget decisions.

In the end, many of the cuts were staved off, though problematic cuts remained. Education funding was maintained at nearly the same low level as the previous year. Families receiving cash assistance were not granted a statutorily-required cost-of-living adjustment (COLA). A family in a high-cost county now receives only \$29 dollars more than a family similarly situated in 1989–90. This obviously impacts buying

power. The grant level is \$149 less than the fair market value for a one-bedroom house in California. It is children who suffer when daily needs cannot be met by assistance payments.

The Governor cut new money allocated by the Legislature to the Community Care Licensing (CCL) Division of the Department of Social Services, the office that oversees the health and safety requirements for child care and foster care providers. CCL serves a basic health and safety function, but has been plagued by cuts and understaffing in recent years. Children bear the brunt of the hardship when inadequate funding results in dangerous care situations; not surprisingly, the number of problems arising in CCL-monitored facilities has been rising with the continued underfunding.

While legislative deliberations were being held inside the Capitol, there was an ongoing “outside” game of political chicken being played. The unions rallied early in the year against the perceived threat from the Governor’s proposals. They took to the airwaves and the streets with vigor protesting the Governor and his policies. The Legislature was more circumspect, but it continued to balk at being party to the Governor’s reform efforts. Besides the reorganization of California’s correctional agencies and the technology department, the Legislature had given the Governor little to show for his efforts.

Various interest groups began drafting language to take to the ballot. There were multiple versions of the Governor’s pet issues, each with a slightly different approach, being stewarded through the initiative process. Because this process does not allow for amendment, this strategy allowed proponents to choose the most viable of the many options to ultimately seek placement on the ballot. It also provided a constant reminder of the Governor’s threat to take his reforms to the electorate if the Legislature did not act. It seemed more likely that there would be a special election with each passing day.

On June 13, 2005, Governor Schwarzenegger did in fact call the special election, scheduled for November 8, 2005. The ballot includes seven initiatives. Only one, which deals with requirements for parental notification prior to a teenager to receive an abortion, is unrelated to the tension at the Capitol. The rest were either placed by the Governor’s supporters or as a response against the Governor’s platform. They deal with teacher tenure, the use of union dues, prescription drug costs, the state budgeting process, and the energy market.

Though the pre-special election proclamation political jockeying had definitely influenced the year’s legislative activity, the landscape changed significantly when the election was actually called. The Democrats had serious concern about both the initiative limiting the use of union dues in political campaigns and about the initiative dealing with the budget process. The concern around the former was largely political, as most Democrats rely heavily on unions for campaign fundraising, and the one-sided campaign funding reform effort, as contained in Proposition 75, would disproportionately impact funding upon which the Democrats rely heavily. The latter, the final iteration of the Governor’s “Live Within our Means” reform, was a concern because it would significantly shift budgetary power to the Governor by establishing a process whereby the Governor could make budget decisions without legislative oversight. Additionally, it would set up a spending equation that would severely constrain the State’s ability to have a flexible budget process. The Democrat’s concerns were echoed with vigor by advocates who estimated that the measure would automatically ratchet down spending without regard to need or policy implications.

The special election itself continued to pique concerns in the advocate community that the unforgiving and rigid initiative process was being used more often to deal with tough policy issues, issues that are often highly complex with widespread impact. The initiative process is not driven by deliberate consideration. Instead, campaign spending drives the process, which excludes many public interest efforts. Though this charge can also be levied at the legislative process, legislators and the Governor have a better understanding across the breadth of issues facing the state, and have a sense of the interconnectedness of policy areas. Though uneven, the playing field at the statehouse is still a more appropriate venue for most policy debates.

The desire to be well-positioned for the special election drove much of legislative activity during the last few months. It helped expedite getting a budget completed. The Democratic majority did not want to appear obstructionist and play into the Governor's portrayal of legislators as do-nothings. That, combined with the shift in focus to Governor-driven reform efforts and the ongoing budget constraints, contributed to a fairly lackluster legislative year. There was little groundbreaking legislation to make it through the process.

Regrettably, this is not a new phenomenon for legislation of importance to children. So much reform related to children involves substantial cost, such as where measures seek to meaningfully expand eligibility for programs that contribute to children's health and well-being. The ongoing budget deficit makes it difficult to pursue this type of legislation. As a result, legislators are often hesitant to take on bills with significant state cost. In the instances when they do, the Appropriations Committee often becomes a convenient place to end a bill's legislative life. Bills with a fiscal impact of at least \$150,000 receive additional scrutiny on the Appropriations Suspense file, where the bill can be held without a vote. This creates a well-utilized opportunity to kill—with impunity and a lack of accountability—any bills that are too expensive or politically inexpedient.

There were a few child-related legislative highlights. The Legislature passed Assembly Member Wilma Chan's bill, AB 772, to create the Healthy Kids Program, an umbrella health coverage program that would have included both Healthy Families and Medi-Cal. Healthy Kids would have also sought to expand coverage to those children who are uninsured but do not meet the eligibility requirements for the two existing programs. The bill was widely hailed by advocates across the state as an important opportunity to ensure coverage for all children in California. The Governor, who in his 2003 campaign stated that "[w]e have to make sure that every child in California is insured," vetoed the bill.

Two legislators were successful in passing bills on children's health that were the culmination of many years of work. Senator Martha Escutia was successful in completing her vision for improving children's nutritional programs at school. Her two bills, SB 12 and SB 965, ensured the implementation of nutritional standards for food served at school and expanded the prohibition of the sale of soda on school campuses to high schools, respectively. On Senator Escutia's first attempt to regulate soda sales at schools, she was almost laughed out of the Capitol. But as the obesity epidemic became more evident and doctors began diagnosing significant numbers of children with a form of diabetes previously only diagnosed in adults, concern about nutrition and soda intake significantly increased. This year, Governor Schwarzenegger joined Senator Escutia in sponsoring the legislation. Both bills were signed into law.

Assembly Member Juan Vargas also had a significant victory passing a bill, AB 121, which will help protect children from having access to candies with high levels of lead. Assembly Member Vargas first introduced a bill dealing with this issue in 2003. Newspaper stories helped drive the issue by exposing the high lead levels in some candies imported from Mexico. However, there was no mechanism in place to regulate these candies. In previous years, candy manufacturers and Mexican commerce organizations created insurmountable opposition; this year, the Legislature passed a bill and the Governor signed it into law.

Unfortunately, as is usually the case, children and their needs were mainly an afterthought in the legislative year. Despite the growing need to address child poverty and hunger, the thousands of youth that languish in the child welfare system, and the sad state of education, children continue to be taken into account only when politically expedient. In January, the Governor asked the Legislature whether they would choose children or special interests in the policy battles ahead. Neither the Governor nor the Legislature chose children this year. It is our job as advocates and citizens to continue to ask that question, and to agitate for a real showing of support for kids from elected officials. And with the growing emphasis on the initiative process, we must also hold ourselves accountable for making decisions on the ballot initiatives with children's interests at heart.

Subjects Graded

2005 BILLS

CHILD POVERTY

AB 48 (Lieber) would have raised the minimum wage, in two stages, to \$7.75 by July 1, 2007. Additionally, it would have required annual increases based on inflation. Although higher than the federal minimum wage of \$5.75, California's minimum wage is the lowest on the West Coast. Almost 60% of people earning minimum wage are over 25 and working full-time. This statistic likely represents many parents. Unfortunately, a full-time job at minimum wage cannot meet the cost of living for a single adult, let alone a family. Increasing the minimum wage would provide some economic relief to the families relying on minimum wage jobs to support their families and help mitigate child poverty.

STATUS: On September 29, 2005, this bill was vetoed by the Governor.

AB 855 (Bass) would have allowed persons previously convicted of drug felonies related to possession or use to receive CalWORKs, California's work and income assistance program for families. Families who would otherwise be eligible but for a parent who has been previously convicted of this type of crime must currently survive on the child-only assistance grant. This assistance does not meet the high cost of living in California, unnecessarily exacerbating child poverty. Additionally, CalWORKs eligibility would increase the supportive services available to assist the parent's recovery and prevent recidivism, thus further stabilizing the child's environment.

STATUS: On October 7, 2005, this bill was vetoed by the Governor.

SB 493 (Kuehl) would have established a six-month transitional period in CalWORKs and Cal-Learn, a program that provides educational and supportive services for teenagers under 19 who are pregnant and parenting and have not achieved a high school diploma, during which a teen could work toward meeting program eligibility requirements, and would have clarified under what circumstances a teen could be served by the different programs. The changes would have helped ensure that more teens receive the support services that have been shown to improve educational and work rates. This additional educational attainment would have been a stabilizing force in both the teen and his/her child's lives.

STATUS: This bill was passed by the Senate but died in the Assembly Appropriations' suspense file.

NUTRITION

AB 696 (Chu) would have eliminated the Food Stamp eligibility requirement that all adults in an applicant's household be fingerprinted. This costly requirement, initially implemented to detect fraud, has become obsolete as new anti-fraud detection processes were implemented and has served as a deterrent to Food Stamp enrollment. Only 39% of eligible Californians are currently receiving Food Stamps. Nationally, 51% of Food Stamp recipients are children. Removing enrollment impediments would necessarily mean more children are served and that fewer children will face food insecurity or hunger.

STATUS: On October 7, 2005, this bill was vetoed by the Governor.

AB 1385 (Laird) requires the State Department of Education (SDE) to develop and implement a data matching system to directly certify recipients of public assistance programs for enrollment in the National School Lunch and School Breakfast programs. Currently, a child who receives public assistance must also complete a separate eligibility determination for school food programs, despite the fact that income eligibility requirements would have been determined by the previous application process. This bill will improve the administration of the school food programs so that eligible children receive the school meals that will help them grow and learn at school.

STATUS: This measure was signed by the Governor on September 28, 2005 (Chapter 361, Statutes of 2005).

SB 12 (Escutia) implements the nutrition requirements for school meals established SB 19 (Chapter 913, Statutes of 2001). The nutritional requirements established by SB 19 prohibited sale of foods at schools with more than 35% of total calories from fat, more than 10% of total calories from saturated fat, and more than 35% of total weight from sugar. The implementation of SB 19 was tied to the appropriation of funds for nutritional policy development grants, support and technical assistance to school districts, and increasing state school meal reimbursements. None have been funded. Eliminating the requirement for funding of the adjunct programs requires implementation of the nutritional standards, which make school food healthier and help improve children's diet and well-being.

STATUS: This measure was signed by the Governor on September 15, 2005 (Chapter 235, Statutes of 2005).

SB 965 (Escutia) prohibits of the sale of soda on high school campuses. Current law already prohibits the sale of soda at elementary and middle schools. But a study published in the journal Lancet showed that for each additional serving of sugar-sweetened beverage increased both the Body Mass Index (BMI) and frequency of obesity in teens. SB 965 will help limit the ready availability of sodas at schools and will contribute to healthier habits for teens.

STATUS: This bill was signed by the Governor on September 15, 2005 (Chapter 237, Statutes of 2005).

HEALTH / SAFETY

AB 121 (Vargas) requires the Department of Health Services to regulate candy, thus enabling it to detect lead in candy and inform the public about candy that has high lead content. Lead in candy has become a public health concern after candy imported from Mexico tested dangerously high for lead. Lead has long been known as a toxin with especially detrimental impacts on children under six. This bill will help prevent lead poisoning in children.

STATUS: This bill was signed by the Governor on October 7, 2005 (Chapter 707, Statutes of 2005).

AB 178 (Koretz) provides that only self-extinguishing cigarettes may be sold in California starting in January 2007. The bill seeks to decrease fire-related injuries and death. The National Fire Protection Association reports that cigarettes are the leading cause of fatal deaths and the third leading cause of fire-related injuries in the United States. Similar legislation in New York has resulted in a significant drop in cigarette fire deaths. This bill will help protect children from fires started by unattended cigarettes that continue to burn without extinguishing.

STATUS: This bill was signed by the Governor on October 7, 2005 (Chapter 633, Statutes of 2005).

AB 264 (Chan) would have created several requirements related to managing asthma in schools. For example, it would have required each school district that is given a plan developed by a student's health care provider to control a student's asthma to keep the plan in a centralized location, and required districts to make information on preventing and treating asthma attacks available to any teacher of any student for whom an asthma action plan is submitted. An estimated 15% of California children ages 6–17 have been diagnosed with asthma; approximately 70% of these children experienced asthma symptoms within the last year. This bill would have taken steps toward giving teachers with the tools they need to gain a basic understanding of asthma, such as common asthma triggers found in the school environment, awareness of signs and symptoms, and knowledge of the appropriate action or response to initiate assistance when required.

STATUS: This bill was passed by the Assembly but died in the Senate Appropriations' suspense file.

AB 772 (Chan) would have established the California Healthy Kids (CHK) Program, an umbrella health program for children. CHK would have connected existing health access programs like Medi-Cal and Healthy Families and provided new coverage options for children ineligible for existing programs. The intent was to ensure health coverage for all children in California through 21. By increasing access to health care, this bill would have contributed to improved health outcomes for children.

STATUS: On October 7, 2005, this bill was vetoed by the Governor.

AB 624 (Montañez) would have allowed a family to simultaneously apply for a child's pre-enrollment coverage and enrollment in either Medi-Cal or Healthy Families through the Child Health and Disability Prevention (CHDP) Gateway. The current application process requires two applications, the pre-enrollment application through the CHDP Gateway and the submittal of an application through the regular process. This change would have simplified the process to help ensure that eligible youth receive uninterrupted medical coverage.

STATUS: On October 7, 2005, this bill was vetoed by the Governor.

SB 116 (Dutton) makes the currently temporary "Safe Surrender" law permanent. "Safe Surrender" allows a parent to surrender a baby without persecution to designated safe surrender sites within three days of the baby's birth. Since the law's passage in 2000, 74 children have been surrendered at these designated sites. The existence of safe surrender sites provides parents a safe alternative to abandonment and saves children's lives.

STATUS: This bill was signed by the Governor on October 7, 2005 (Chapter 625, Statutes of 2005).

CHILD CARE

AB 1565 (Pavely) would have required the Department of Education to develop and oversee a contract for the study of the development, implementation, and evaluation of effectiveness of a quality rating system for child care centers and family child care homes. There has been an ongoing dialogue regarding the effectiveness of a rating system for child care providers with strong advocates both in support and opposition. A study of a proposed rating plan would have helped illuminate the issues and educate the discussions around the definition of quality for child care providers.

STATUS: On October 7, 2005, this bill was vetoed by the Governor.

SB 640 (Escutia) appropriates \$5 million in federal child development funds to continue local programs for training and technical assistance for child care providers to increase their capacity for children with disabilities. This will help support providers serve children with disabilities, a segment of the population that is significantly underserved.

STATUS: This bill was signed by the Governor on September 29, 2005 (Chapter 379, Statutes of 2005).

CHILD PROTECTION

AB 824 (Chu) extends eligibility for THP+, a transitional housing program for emancipated foster youth, from age 21 to 24. The program currently allows youth to access housing for two consecutive years between 18–21. However, many youth seek program services closer to their 21st birthday than their 18th birthday, which precludes them from the service benefits. By expanding the eligibility window, SB 824 will ensure that a larger population of former foster youth can access the successful transition program.

STATUS: This bill was signed by the Governor on October 7, 2005 (Chapter 636, Statutes of 2005).

AB 1412 (Leno) requires that foster youth who are 10 years old or older and have been removed from their home for at least six months be asked about important people in their lives. It also requires that older foster youth be included in the development of his/her case plan. Identification of important people in a foster child's life can facilitate permanent, supportive relationships for foster youth. Inclusion in planning for his/her future supports a youth's development and emphasizes the value of his/her opinion.

STATUS: This bill was signed by the Governor on October 7, 2005 (Chapter 640, Statutes of 2005).

SB 218 (Scott) establishes a new category of foster placement, "prospective adoptive parent," for foster families who have determined they would like to adopt their foster children. It also requires court oversight of a decision to remove a child from the home of a designated prospective adoptive parent. Currently, court oversight of a child's placement ends once the child's parental rights have been terminated. Court oversight of placement changes from a prospective adoptive home will help ensure that the move is in the child's best interest and add additional protection for the child from arbitrary moves.

STATUS: This bill was signed by the Governor on October 7, 2005 (Chapter 626, Statutes of 2005).

SB 500 (Kuehl) establishes protocols within the dependency system for placing and providing services to dependent youth who are themselves parents and establishes the "whole family foster home" as a placement option for serving the family. It requires that a shared responsibility plan be established between the dependant parent and his/her foster placement to clarify the responsibility for meeting the baby's needs. This bill will strengthen California's policy supporting the preservation of families, and will help limit the cycle of neglect and abuse by supporting dependent teens and teaching them the responsibilities of parenting.

STATUS: This bill was signed by the Governor on October 7, 2005 (Chapter 630, Statutes of 2005).

MISCELLANEOUS

AB 168 (Ridley-Thomas) would have required the Department of Finance to report every other year on tax expenditures that result in a revenue loss of at least \$25 million. Tax expenditures include tax credits, deductions, exclusions, and exemption. The current budgeting process primarily focuses on money proactively spent on programs, but little review is undertaken on tax expenditures, which significantly impact California's fiscal health. This bill would have supported a more thorough analysis of both sides of California's financial ledger and could have helped the state have a more balanced discussion of its financial priorities, including meeting the needs of children in California.

STATUS: On September 22, 2005, this bill was vetoed by the Governor.

How Legislators Were Graded

METHODOLOGY

All the bills included in this *Report Card* would improve current law for children. An “AYE” vote on these measures represents a vote for children and is indicated by a “★.” “NO” votes and abstentions are noted with a “–,” indicating the legislator was not there for children. Abstentions count against a legislator’s score because a legislator who fails to vote effectively votes “NO.” In cases where a legislator had an excused absence when the floor vote was taken (for illness, legislative business, etc.), the vote will be noted with a “–*” but will count as a “NO” vote for purposes of the legislator’s total grade. Bills held in the suspense file of the Senate or Assembly Appropriations Committee will be noted with “–**”; for our purposes, each and every legislator’s failure to pull the bill from suspense qualifies as a “NO.” Vacancies in a legislative seat are noted with a “V.”

- ★ means **A VOTE FOR CHILDREN**
(an “AYE” vote)
- means **NOT THERE FOR CHILDREN**
(a “no” vote or abstention; counts as a NO vote)
- * means **EXCUSED ABSENCE**
(illness, legislative business, etc.; counts as a NO vote)
- ** means **HELD IN SUSPENSE**
(counts as a NO vote)
- V means **VACANT SEAT**

The *2005 Children’s Legislative Report Card* evaluates final floor votes on selected bills affecting children. When bills were amended in the second house, the concurrence vote in the house of origin was used to compute those legislators’ scores, so that comparing Senate and Assembly votes on the same bills will reflect votes on the same version of the bill. Where a bill was passed by one house but held in the suspense file of the other house, legislators in the bill’s house of origin receive the grade reflecting their floor vote; legislators in the second house receive the equivalent of a “NO” vote for failing to pull the bill from suspense for a public vote.

Legislators’ overall scores indicate the percentage of affirmatively cast votes for children on the legislation presented. Votes and attendance were tallied from the Assembly and Senate Daily Journals and the Legislative Counsel’s website (www.leginfo.ca.gov).

	Legislator	POVERTY			NUTRITION	HEALTH/SAFETY											
		AB 48 (Lieber)	AB 855 (Bass)	SB 493 (Kuehl)		AB 696 (Chu)	AB 1365 (Laird)	SB 12 (Escutia)	SB 965 (Escutia)	AB 121 (Vargas)	AB 178 (Koretz)	AB 264 (Chan)	AB 772 (Chan)	AB 624 (Montanez)	SB 116 (Dutton)		
SENATORS	Anestad	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-		
	Ackerman	-	-	-	-	*	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*		
	Alarcon	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Alquist	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Ashburn	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*		
	Battin	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*	-	-	-	-	-	*		
	Bowen	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Campbell	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*		
	Cedillo	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Chesbro	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	*	*	
	Cox	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*		
	Denham	-	-	*	-	-	*	*	*	*	-	-	-	-	*		
	Ducheny	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Dunn	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Dutton	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*		
	Escutia	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	*	*	
	Figueroa	*	*	*	*	*	-	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Florez	*	-	*	*	-	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Hollingsworth	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*		
	Kehoe	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Kuehl	*	*	*	*	*	-	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Lowenthal	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Machado	*	-	*	*	*	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*	
	Maldonado	*	-	*	*	-	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Margett	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*	
	McClintock	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*	
	Migden	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	*	*	
	Morrow	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	
	Murray ¹	*	-	*	*	*	-	*	-	*	-	*	-	*	-	*	
	Ortiz	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Perata	*	*	*	*	*	-	*	*	*	-	*	*	*	*	*	
	Poochigian	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*	
	Romero	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
Runner	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*		
Scott	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
Simitian	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
Soto	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
Speier	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
Torlakson	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
Vincent	*	*	*	*	*	-	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*		
ASSEMBLYMEMBERS	Aghazarian	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	*		
	Arambula	*	-	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Baca	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Bass	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Benoit	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*	
	Berg	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Bermudez	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Blakeslee	-	-	-**	-	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Bogh	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*	
	Calderon	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Canciamilla	*	-	-**	-	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Chan	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Chavez	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Chu	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Cogdill	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*	
	Cohn	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Coto	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	
	Daucher	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*	
	De La Torre	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*

★ : A VOTE FOR CHILDREN (an "aye" vote)

- : NOT THERE FOR CHILDREN (a "no" vote or abstention)

	CHILD CARE		CHILD PROTECTION	MISCELLANEOUS				AB 168 (Ridley-Thomas)	2005 Votes for Children	2005 Grade	Legislator
	AB 1565 (Pavley)	SB 640 (Escutia)		AB 824 (Chiu)	AB 1412 (Leno)	SB 218 (Scott)	SB 500 (Kuehl)				
	-	*	-	-	*	*	-	4 of 20	20%	Aanestad	
	-	-	*	-	*	*	-	5 of 20	25%	Ackerman	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Alarcon	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Alquist	
	-	-	*	-	*	*	-	4 of 20	20%	Ashburn	
	-	-	*	-	*	*	-	6 of 20	30%	Battin	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	18 of 20	90%	Bowen	
	-	-	-	-	*	*	-	4 of 20	20%	Campbell	
	*	*	*	-	*	-	*	16 of 20	80%	Cedillo	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	17 of 20	85%	Chesbro	
	-	-	*	-	*	*	-	4 of 20	20%	Cox	
	*	*	*	-	*	*	-	10 of 20	50%	Denham	
	*	*	-*	*	*	*	*	17 of 20	85%	Ducheny	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Dunn	
	-	-	*	-	*	*	-	5 of 20	25%	Dutton	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	18 of 20	90%	Escutia	
	*	*	*	-	*	*	*	17 of 20	85%	Figueroa	
	*	*	-	*	*	*	*	16 of 20	80%	Florez	
	-	-	*	-	*	-	-	3 of 20	15%	Hollingsworth	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Kehoe	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	18 of 20	90%	Kuehl	
	*	*	*	-	*	*	*	18 of 20	90%	Lowenthal	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	16 of 20	80%	Machado	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	15 of 20	75%	Maldonado	
	-	-	*	-	*	*	-	5 of 20	25%	Margett	
	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	2 of 20	10%	McClintock	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	18 of 20	90%	Migden	
	-	-	*	-	*	-	-	2 of 20	10%	Morrow	
	*	*	-	-*	*	-	-*	6 of 20	30%	Murray ¹	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Ortiz	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	17 of 20	85%	Perata	
	-	-	*	-	*	*	-	5 of 20	25%	Poohigian	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	18 of 20	90%	Romero	
	-	-	*	-	*	*	-	5 of 20	25%	Runner	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	18 of 20	90%	Scott	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	18 of 20	90%	Simitian	
	*	*	*	-	*	-	*	17 of 20	85%	Soto	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Speier	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Torlakson	
	*	*	*	*	*	-*	*	17 of 20	85%	Vincent	
	*	*	*	-	*	*	-	8 of 20	40%	Aghazarian	
	*	*	*	*	-	*	*	16 of 20	80%	Arambula	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	18 of 20	90%	Baca	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Bass	
	*	-	*	-	*	*	-	6 of 20	30%	Benoit	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Berg	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Bermudez	
	*	-	*	-	*	*	-	10 of 20	50%	Blakeslee	
	*	-	*	-	*	*	-	6 of 20	30%	Bogh	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Calderon	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	16 of 20	80%	Canciamilla	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Chan	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Chavez	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Chu	
	*	-	*	-	-	*	-	5 of 20	25%	Cogdill	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Cohn	
	*	*	*	*	*	-	*	18 of 20	90%	Coto	
	*	-	*	*	*	*	-	9 of 20	45%	Daucher	
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	De La Torre	

-* : EXCUSED ABSENCE

-** : HELD IN SUSPENSE (counts as a NO vote)

V : VACANT SEAT

1. : Senator Murray missed several floor votes due to a family member's illness.

Legislator	POVERTY			NUTRITION	HEALTH/SAFETY										
	AB 48 (Lieber)	AB 855 (Bass)	SB 493 (Kuehl)		AB 696 (Chu)	AB 1385 (Laird)	SB 12 (Escutia)	SB 965 (Escutia)	AB 121 (Vargas)	AB 178 (Koretz)	AB 264 (Chan)	AB 772 (Chan)	AB 624 (Montanez)	SB 116 (Dutton)	
Devore	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	
Dymally	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Emmerson	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	*	*	
Evans	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Frommer	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Garcia	*	-	-**	-	*	*	-	-	*	-	*	*	*	*	*
Goldberg	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Hancock	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Harman	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	*	*
Haynes	-	-	-**	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*
J. Horton	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
S. Horton	*	-	-**	-	*	*	*	*	*	-	*	*	*	*	*
Houston	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*
Huff	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*
Jones	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Karnette	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Keene	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*
Klehs	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Koretz	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Laird	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
LaMalfa	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*
LaSuer	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*
Leno	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Leslie	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*
Levine	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Lieber	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Liu	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Matthews	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Maze	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*
McCarthy	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	*	-	-	*	*
Montanez	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Mountjoy	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*
Mullin	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Nakanishi	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*
Nation	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Nava	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Negrete McLeod	*	*	-**	*	*	-	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Niello	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*
Nunez	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Oropeza	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Parra	*	-	-**	*	*	*	-	-	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Pavley	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Plescia	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*
Richman	-	-	-**	-	*	*	*	*	*	-	*	-	*	*	*
Ridley-Thomas	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Runner	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*
Ruskin	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Saldana	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Salinas	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Spitzer	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	*	-	-	-	-	*	*
Strickland	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*
Torrico	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Tran	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	*	-	*	-	*	*	*
Umberg	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Vargas	*	*	-**	*	*	-	-	-	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Villines	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*
Walters	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*
Wolk	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Wyland	-	-	-**	-	*	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	*	*
Yee	*	*	-**	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	*
Vacant ²	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	V

ASSEMBLYMEMBERS

★ : A VOTE FOR CHILDREN (an "aye" vote)

- : NOT THERE FOR CHILDREN (a "no" vote or abstention)

	CHILD CARE		CHILD PROTECTION	MISCELLANEOUS				2005 Votes for Children	2005 Grade	Legislator
	AB 1565 (Pavley)	SB 640 (Escutia)		AB 824 (Chiu)	AB 1412 (Leno)	SB 218 (Scott)	SB 500 (Kuehl)			
	-	-	*	-	*	*	-	5 of 20	25%	Devore
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Dymally
	-	-	*	-	*	*	-	7 of 20	35%	Emmerson
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Evans
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Frommer
	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	14 of 20	70%	Garcia
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Goldberg
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Hancock
	-	-	*	-	*	*	-	6 of 20	30%	Harman
	-	*	-	-	*	-	-	3 of 20	15%	Haynes
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	J. Horton
	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	15 of 20	75%	S. Horton
	*	-	*	-	-	*	-	5 of 20	25%	Houston
	-	-	*	-	-	*	-	5 of 20	25%	Huff
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Jones
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Karnette
	*	*	*	-	*	*	-	7 of 20	35%	Keene
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Kiehs
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Koretz
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Laird
	*	*	*	-	*	*	-	7 of 20	35%	LaMalfa
	-	-	*	*	-	*	-	5 of 20	25%	LaSuer
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Leno
	-	-	*	-	*	*	-	5 of 20	25%	Leslie
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Levine
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Lieber
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Liu
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	18 of 20	90%	Matthews
	-	-	*	-	-	*	-	4 of 20	20%	Maze
	*	*	*	-	*	*	-	8 of 20	40%	McCarthy
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Montanez
	-	-	*	-	*	*	-	5 of 20	25%	Mountjoy
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Mullin
	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	9 of 20	45%	Nakanishi
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Nation
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Nava
	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	17 of 20	85%	Negrete McLeod
	-	-	*	-	-	*	-	4 of 20	20%	Niello
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Nunez
	*	*	*	*	-	*	*	17 of 20	85%	Oropeza
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	17 of 20	85%	Parra
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Pavley
	*	-	*	-	*	*	-	6 of 20	30%	Plescia
	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	13 of 20	65%	Richman
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Ridley-Thomas
	*	*	*	-	*	*	-	7 of 20	35%	Runner
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Ruskin
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Saldana
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Salinas
	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	9 of 20	45%	Spitzer
	-	-	*	-	*	*	-	5 of 20	25%	Strickland
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Torrico
	*	*	*	*	*	*	-	11 of 20	55%	Tran
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Umberg
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	17 of 20	85%	Vargas
	*	-	*	-	*	*	-	6 of 20	30%	Villines
	-	*	-	-	*	*	-	5 of 20	25%	Walters
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Wolk
	-	-	*	-	*	*	-	6 of 20	30%	Wyland
	*	*	*	*	*	*	*	19 of 20	95%	Yee
	V	V	V	V	V	V	V	n/a	n/a	Vacant ²

-* : EXCUSED ABSENCE

-** : HELD IN SUSPENSE (counts as a NO vote)

V : VACANT SEAT

2. : Assemblymember Gordon passed away on June 25, 2005.



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